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Due to increasing concerns about data piracy, digital rights management of databases
is becoming an extremely important area of research. There have recently been some
pioneering works in this area that help establish ownership of relational data. In
this thesis, we firstly consider the more general buyer-seller scenario where an owner
of the database sells it to many different customers. For this case, obviously it is
necessary to individually identify each copy of the data sold so as to precisely and
reliably identify the source in case of piracy. Also, such a scheme would be susceptible
to collusion attacks in which a set of legitimate buyers collude together to illegally
tamper the watermark. We present a novel Individualized Watermarking scheme for
the need. Secondly, we propose an Invertible Watermarking scheme for protecting
precision-critical databases, where there is a need to reverse the original data. Ex-
periments conducted on a commercial database system confirm that the proposed
methods can survive a wide variety of attacks. Moreover, Incremental Watermarking
for the second scenario is very effective when normal updates of the databases are
frequently conducted.
Keywords: Watermarking of relational databases; Fingerprinting; Collusion-resistant
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With the rapid growth of the Internet, unauthorized duplication and distribution of
digital data is becoming effortless requiring minimal capital expenditure and provid-
ing easy illegal revenue. Digital data is easy to replicate, alter and transmit. However,
if such piracy becomes widespread, it would undermine the very basis of the trade
of digital goods. These very characteristics that have enabled the digital revolution
become a scourge from the protection point of view of intellectual property rights.
Nowadays, not only image and music (audio) industries, but also movie (video) indus-
tries are encountering big piracy problems, due to the file-sharing Web communities
and the increase of the Internet bandwidth. Therefore, digital rights management is
increasingly being a matter of great concern.
Digital watermarking and fingerprinting appear to be very promising solutions
for these problems. Digital watermarking aims at protecting a digital content from
unauthorized redistribution and copying by enabling ownership provability over the
content. Fingerprinting is a special form of digital watermarking for the purpose of
identifying the recipients who have been provided the content. In case of unauthorized
disclosure, the owner should be able to trace the source of piracy.
1
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Though various techniques of digital watermarking and fingerprinting do not strictly
prevent illegal copying, they do deter such copying by establishing the original own-
ership of an illegally redistributed copy. There is a rich body of literature on wa-
termarking multimedia data [17, 7, 20]. Most of the research in the area of digital
watermarking has focused on multimedia content which includes digital still images,
audio and video sources. These techniques have traditionally relied on the availability
of a large ”bandwidth” within which information can be indelibly and imperceptibly
inserted while remaining certain essential properties of the original contents. Much
of the bandwidth is due to the insensitivity of human sensory system (for example,
human visual system) to perceive the small changes or distortions introduced into the
content.
More recently, with the focus of protecting digital rights shifting, there emerged
new concerns on protecting the ownership of software [27], natural languages [3],
digital circuits [23], and structured data like trees, graphs, or solution of optimization
problems [21], etc.
In general, the goal of digital watermarking is to insert a robust watermark into the
digital content such that the mark does not destroy the value of the content, and the
mark is hard to be removed by adversaries without destroying the utility of content.
The measurement of the value of the content is closely related to the data type and its
intended use. Obviously, for images and video clips, the utility is judged by the visual
quality of the images and video clips. As for text, the value may be in conveying the
same meaning, while for software the value may be preserved by ensuring equivalent
computation [27], etc.
The extensive use of databases in applications is creating a need for protecting copy-
right of databases. Although work in the area of database security is well-established
[4, 5, 16, 18, 26], relatively little work has been done in the area of database water-
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marking. There have recently been some pioneering works reported in [2, 29] and
the more recent work of [30]. There are a range of watermarking techniques avail-
able for protection of ownership, authentication and content integrity. Given the lead
that multimedia watermarking research has over database watermarking research,
one would hope that the standard multimedia techniques can be just carried over to
the realm of relational databases. However, there exist some fundamental differences
between the characteristics of multimedia data and relational data, which make the
adaptation of the known watermarking techniques not as easy as one would have
desired. The main differences between multimedia data and relational data from the
point of view of watermarking are as following:
• Portions of multimedia object cannot be dropped freely [2]. On the contrary,
database tuples are frequently deleted and inserted.
• Multimedia objects have fixed relative spatial/temporal positioning and neigh-
borhood correlation, while tuples of a relation have no such implied ordering.
• Multimedia objects possess a tremendous amount of redundancy, thus providing
a larger channel to hide information [2].
• Database tuples have primary and foreign key relationships, so that improper
modification of an attribute value may not only destroy the usability of this
value, but could destroy the result of join operation. On the contrary, with
multimedia data, we do not have such concern.
• There are many psycho-physical phenomena based on the human visual system
and human auditory system which can be exploited for watermark embedding.
For example, the textured areas in images can be utilized for hiding many
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watermark bits that cannot be noticed by the human eyes [19]. In general, one
cannot exploit such phenomena in relational databases.
Due to the above challenges, techniques developed for multimedia data cannot be
directly used for watermarking relational databases. Therefore, new watermarking
techniques for databases have to be designed.
1.1 Motivation
Given the work and techniques devised for watermarking relational databases, it is
now possible to establish ownership of a redistributed copy of relations. However, it
is far inadequate to trace the illegal parties (traitors) who redistribute the database.
The feasibility and reliability of traitor tracing is important as it helps identify the
data buyer should the copyright issue be brought to court. Thus it is highly desirable
if we can identify the recipients (buyers) to whom the data have been provided by
the database owners. While techniques for fingerprinting multimedia data are well-
established in literature [6, 10], they are not directly applicable to relational databases.
In this thesis, we develop an Individualized Watermarking technique for relational
databases that can both establish ownership and identify individual buyers of the
relational databases. Besides surviving the attacks in the form of data re-sorting,
subset selection, subset addition, etc, the individualized watermarks should be buyer
specific and resistant to collusion attacks.
Besides the importance of traitor tracing, we are also motivated by the scenario
where the integrity and accuracy of the data (precision-critical data) is as important
as the ability to assert ownership and to trace traitors. Examples of real world data
sets that are precision-critical include medical data, military data, satellite data, and
so on. These data are both sensitive (where protection of the data is important) and
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precision-critical (where errors in the data renders the data useless). It is noteworthy
that even a normal attribute such as salary can be sensitive and precision-critical, as
salary is confidential while inaccuracy of this attribute is disastrous. Therefore, we
present a technique of Invertible Watermarking databases, where privileged users of
the databases can losslessly remove the watermark and view the intact data, while
the non-privileged users can only get access to the watermarked data.
1.2 Problem Statement
The scope of this work falls into two major parts: one is Individualized Watermark-
ing of relational databases, where ownership establishment and traitor tracing are
enabled. The proposed technique is collusion-resistant, such that even the attempt
of a few buyers colluding together to destroy the individualized watermarks will not
be successful. The formal security analysis is given as well as the experiment results
conducted on TPC-H benchmarked databases. Both the analysis and the experiment
results show that the individualized watermark can withstand a variety of malicious
attacks and benign updates, thus verify the feasibility and reliability of our proposed
technique.
The other problem we are to address is Invertible Watermarking of precision-critical
data. For the privileged users, the precision-critical data can be recovered without
error, while being meaningless for non-privileged users. We introduce the idea of
hierarchical access of the data, and enable the function of Incremental Watermarking
when only a small portion of the database are modified or updated. Experimental
results show that Incremental Watermarking is cost effective, making it suitable for
real applications due to its low overhead.
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1.3 Overview
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follow. The related works on digital
watermarking and fingerprinting multimedia content, as well as watermarking re-
lational databases are given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the Individualized
Watermarking technique for relational databases. Chapter 4 covers the issue of In-
vertible Watermarking precision-critical databases. Experiment results for the above
two techniques are included in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. Finally, Chapter
5 gives conclusion and suggestions for future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we shall discuss various approaches to watermarking relational databases
in existing literature, and techniques of fingerprinting as well as invertible (lossless)
watermarking multimedia content.
2.1 Watermarking of Databases
While work in the area of watermarking multimedia data and database security is pro-
liferating, relatively less research has been done in watermarking relational databases.
In a pioneering work of [2], Agrawal and Kiernan first raised the problem of database
watermarking that marks the numeric attributes of relational data. A one-way hash
function depending on a private key known only to the owner is used. The hash func-
tion algorithmically decides the tuples, attributes within a tuple, and bit positions
(LSBs, the least significant bit) in an attribute to be marked, as well as computes
the specific bit values after marking. Only if the attackers have access to the private
key, can the watermark be detected with high probability. On the other hand, the
attackers will either get caught for piracy or greatly reduce the database usability.
7
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The strength of the work in [2] include:
• Identification of the rights management problem for relational data;
• Outline of some requirement difference between watermarking relational databases
and multimedia data;
• List of a scope of possible attacks that the watermark is supposed to survive;
• Empirical evaluation of effectiveness and robustness of the proposed watermark-
ing algorithm, etc.
Though the watermark survives several attacks and preserves mean and variance of
the numeric data, yet it has no guarantee to survive distortion induced on queries. In
other words, it does not fully consider the specific properties of relational databases.
In summary, [2] has the following weaknesses:
• The technique is a LSB watermarking depending on a probabilistic framework
and an empirical detection threshold, so it does not preserve the integrity of the
watermark sequence;
• It cannot preserve the key relationships of a database and the join constraints;
also the uniqueness and relative constraints of the values are not carefully con-
sidered;
• The requirement that the LSB in any tuple can be altered may limit the appli-
cability. For example, an important application such as data mining, requires
the classification to be preserved.
• The vulnerabilities of LSB approach lie in its nature. [2] inherits all the dis-
advantages of LSB (least significant bits) watermarking techniques which has
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been elaborated in [30]. For instance, If an attack assumes that the LSB space
is insignificant, then simply altering the space randomly or zero-ing the LSBs
would immediately defeat the watermark detection.
• Though it can prove the ownership of the database to some extent, it is not able
to trace or prevent redistribution where there are multiple sources of piracy.
While [2] is the pioneering work in watermarking relational databases, it may not
be a practical or useful solution for protecting real data. Also, a similar work reported
in [1] has the similar problems.
Independently, [29] proposed algorithms on watermarking numeric datasets, which
was later extended for watermarking relational data [30]. [30] pre-defines an order
for the numeric dataset, and embeds the watermark bits into the data distribution
properties instead of into the data themselves. For each selected subset Si of the
original dataset, a single watermark bit b is to be encoded into Si. The watermark is
modelled by the percentage of positive “confidence violators” present in Si for a given
confidence factor c and confidence violators hysteresis interval (Vfalse, Vtrue), where
Vfalse < Vfalse, c ∈ {0, 1} are real numbers (e.g. c = 90%, Vtrue = 10%, Vfalse = 7%).
Some usability bounds metrics are defined to identify the range of acceptable
changes to the data. Note that the acceptable level of changes is dependent on
the intended application of the data.
One example of the usability metrics can be defined as maximum allowable mean
squared error, where the mean squared error of each element of the data must be
bounded by its corresponding allowable distortion, so is the sum of the mean squared
errors over all the elements.
Aside from the allowable distortion on individual values and overall distortion lim-
its, there are also some semantic features need to be considered. For example, it
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is critical that ages under 21 should remain so after watermarking if the attribute
“age” is used to determine some behavioral patterns; result of classification should
be preserved for some application; also, for a collection of relations, key relationship
must be preserved, etc.
In the watermarking phase, if the bound is exceeded for some item, the current item
is abandoned, and a new item for watermarking is chosen. The method embeds 1 bit
per subset, so that there are a number of copies of the same bit over the databases.
In the detection phase, for each subset, the algorithm recovers all the watermark
copies embedded in the data, which globally produces a set of copies of the same
watermark bits with various errors. Then it uses a majority-voting over these recov-
ered watermark bits to decide the most likely embedded bit. A trade-off is observed
between the size of each subset and the bandwidth for watermarking. On the one
hand, a larger subset size results in more correctly recovering the watermark bit,
while lowering the watermarking capacity. On the other hand, a smaller subset size
makes the watermark more fragile to attacks.
Comparing with [1, 2], the technique in [30] has the following advantages:
• The watermarking method is more resilient to attacks, because it encodes in the
distribution domain of the data, instead of in the data themselves (e.g. LSBs).
• Unlike [1, 2], where the detection only determines the presence of the watermark,
the detection phase of [29, 30] preserves the integrity of the watermark.
However, [30] has its own limitations:
• It is more costly in terms of the time complexity than [2] in that, for each
attribute column, the mean need to be computed. And for each tuple to be
watermarked, the corresponding attribute must be compared with the column
mean. For another attribute of the same tuple, a new comparison
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• It does not address the issue of identifying different buyers to trace redistribu-
tion, either. Just as in [2, 1], the method proposed in [30] can not prevent the
collusion attack in traitor tracing problems, etc.
In short, [1, 2] and [30] work well when there is one owner (or seller) of the relational
data who would like to establish his/her ownership of the data. For this purpose, a
watermark sequence is embedded in the numeric attributes. In case of an ownership
dispute, i.e. some other person falsely claims ownership of the relational data, a
neutral judge to whom the real owner can disclose the secret key can adjudicate
the dispute. Then the judge will be able to detect the purported watermark. It
is obvious that a fake owner will not be able to extract the embedded watermark.
While the above techniques do solve the extremely important problem of establishing
ownership, but did not address the problem of illegal redistribution. In practice, the
valuable relational data can be sold to more than one buyer. If the cost of purchasing
the data is high, a data pirate may be tempted to legally purchase one copy of the
database (which may carry the owner’s watermark) and then illegally redistribute
copies of the data to other buyers at a drastically reduced price. Or alternatively,
the pirate colludes with a few other malicious buyers to erase the watermarks. Even
if the genuine owner suspects piracy, there is no way of tracing the precise leakage
mechanism.
2.2 Fingerprinting of Databases
In [24], the watermarking technique in [1, 2] is generalized for fingerprinting databases.
It uses a technique similar to that of [1, 2], but with a fingerprinting approach.
Fingerprint bits are distributed uniformly across tuples, and the scheme is robust to
a variety of attacks, including most of those mentioned in [1, 2], as well as collusion
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attacks.
However, just as in the case of [2], the technique requires that the relational tables
have many numerical columns to be watermarked. In the case that only one or a
small number of columns are available for watermarking, the accuracy and reliability
of their technique may be greatly reduced. Most importantly, all the disadvantages
of bit-plane watermarking elaborated hold for this technique. As pointed out in
[30], LSB watermarking techniques have been tried and abandoned even in rights
management of multimedia content.
Gross-Amblard [15] proposed the problem of watermarking databases or XML doc-
uments, while preserving a set of queries. Their approach works for a limited class of
queries only. Moreover, it dose not consider the general problem of collusion attacks,
where several buyers combine together to remove the watermarks. Notwithstanding,
it briefly addressed the problem of auto-collusion attack, where a data owner needs
to update the database and propagate changes to each of the registered data buy-
ers, such that the same buyer can average the data from a few successive versions
of the databases to remove the watermark. Therefore, they suggested a brute-force
update on the databases instead of incrementally updating portions of the database
when condition requires. However, there is neither security analysis nor experimen-
tal study in supporting their contribution on defeating auto-collusion attack. And
clearly, it bears no traitor tracing ability at all.
Motivated by the shortcomings of the above work, we aim at developing a novel
individualized watermarking algorithm which can prove ownership as well as identify
the origins of unauthorized redistribution. Besides the attacks in the form of data
re-sorting, subset selection, subset addition, etc, the individualized watermark should
be buyer specific and resistant to collusion attacks.
In the light of the success of collusion-resistant watermarking for multimedia data,
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we would like to dig more into the literatures on the techniques catered to fingerprint
multimedia content in the following section.
2.3 Collusion-resistant Watermarking
Watermarks (WM) and fingerprints (FP) are both widely used in digital rights man-
agement but they are utilized for distinct purposes. WM is used to designate the
ownership of a dataset. Thus given the host data, the WM is identical in all the
copies sold to establish ownership. On the other hand, FP is used to trace piracy
so as to penalize redistribution. Therefore, FP should be individualized for various
buyers of the data.
Several works have discussed the problem of fingerprinting for digital data(e.g.,
software, documents, and images). For example, Boneh and Shaw [6] proposed a
collusion-secure fingerprinting method for digital data. They discussed methods for
assigning codewords for the purpose of fingerprinting digital data. Fingerprinting
consists of uniquely marking and registering each copy of the data. This marking
allows a distributor to detect any unauthorized copy and trace it back to the specific
buyer.
In [11], distinct spread-spectrum watermark sequences were embedded for different
copies of the data, and collusion attacks were modelled as averaging of copies with
additive noise.
Fiat et al [12] introduced a dynamic traitor-tracing scheme where users are ran-
domly grouped into r subsets, each receiving a distinct symbol. And the tracing is
confined in the subset that includes the pirate only.
[22] presents a novel collusion-resistant watermarking technique that can achieve a
minimum collusion size that grows linearly with the number of copies of the individ-
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ually marked data. Using a secret key, the various copies of the multimedia content
can be identically watermarked, but the individual detection keys are distinct [22].
Knowing one detection key, the attackers cannot remove the watermark or retrieve
a watermark-free copy of the data without making the data useless. Also if the
watermark in one copy is destroyed, enough information about the broken detector
key (fingerprint) can be known. Thus, the technique in [22] can identify those who
participated in a collusion attempt and has traitor-tracing ability.
Given the watermarking key w (referring to the notations in [22]), the ith watermark
detection key hi is defined as hi = w + ci, where ci denote the watermark carrier,
which is different for each buyer and hence it can be considered to be a fingerprint
which identifies each buyer. Obviously, hi is different from w and is distinct for
different buyers of the data. The security of the scheme lies in the fact that even if
the attackers break the detection key hi, as hi does not deterministically reveal w,
they still cannot remove w from the watermarked multimedia content.
For watermark detection, the detector can similarly do a correlation test on the
watermarked data yi of the i
th buyer and the watermark sequence w by using the
classical Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test dW = yi·w to decide whether the watermark
is present or not. It decides that the watermark is present and thus proves the
ownership if dW > δW , where dW is the detection threshold that controls the tradeoff
between the probabilities of false positive and false negative decisions. Otherwise,
the watermark is considered not to be present. Similarly, another test can be done
to reveal the presence of the ith buyer’s fingerprint. dH = yi · hi. If dH > δH , the
fingerprint of the ith user is detected. Otherwise, the fingerprint of the ith user is not
present.
However, the severe limitation of [22] is that if the attackers do not break the
detection keys, and simply distribute the copies without removing the watermark
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 15
information, the seller can only prove ownership of the distributed copies, but can-
not detect the actual illegal distributors. This is not really a limitation under the
assumptions in [22] because they address the problem of multimedia content distri-
bution which assumes that the content has to be played on some standard playback
device which does this type of detection. In that scenario, since each playback device
has an individualized detection key, the above limitation does not really arise since no
one can make use of the data without the playback device. This, however, shows that
the method in [22] is not applicable for watermarking relational data since one cannot
assume the mandatory use of only tamper-proof devices for accessing the data.
In summary, while the current database watermarking mechanism does not have
traitor tracing ability and does not survive collusion attacks, adaptation of the existing
methods of collusion-resistant watermarking multimedia data to watermark databases
is non-trivial.
While our work in Chapter 3 is inspired by the rigorous approach in [22], it is quite
distinct from their work, given the distinct requirements of watermarking relational
databases from watermarking multimedia data. It can both establish ownership and
precisely and reliably identify colluders, no matter the attackers attempt to remove
the watermark or not.
2.4 Invertible Watermarking Mechanisms
Invertible watermarking is also referred to as reversible watermarking, lossless water-
marking, and distortion-free watermarking in literature.
In [14], an invertible watermarking for JPEG image authentication is presented.
The assumption that original images have been lossy-compressed is a drawback. Even
after the watermark is removed, the result is still lossy-compressed image. In [13],
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 16
Fridrich et al improved the idea and applied it to watermark all image formats.
A most recent work in [9] presents a spread-spectrum invertible watermarking sys-
tem for authenticating images in lossless formate. The integrity of the images can be
verified and original images before embedding watermark can be recovered.
However, the techniques in both [9] and [10] are not directly applicable to water-
mark relational databases, given the difference between multimedia data and rela-
tional databases described in Chapter 1.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the related literatures of our work. We first introduced
some works on watermarking of databases and on fingerprinting of databases. Due to
the weaknesses in these techniques, we moved on to study the works done on collusion-
resistant watermarking of multimedia data. Also, we discussed the techniques on
invertible watermarking of images. Chapter 2 paved way for solving the problems




In this chapter, we consider the more general buyer-seller scenario where an owner
of the database sells it to many different customers. For this case, some new difficult
requirements arise. First, there is the need to individually identify each copy of the
data sold in order to precisely and reliably identify the source in case of piracy. Most
of the earlier techniques are not able to distinguish the various buyers of the same
data. Thus, some form of individualized watermark for each buyer is needed for ev-
ery copy sold. Secondly, such a scheme would be susceptible to collusion attacks in
which a set of legitimate buyers collude together to illegally tamper the watermark.
We present a novel watermarking algorithm based on the direct sequence spread-
spectrum technique which embeds the owner’s watermark as well as the individual
buyer’s fingerprint into each copy of the relational data. Our security analysis shows
the feasibility of the proposed technique for real applications. We have applied this
watermarking technique to relational database generated based on TPC-H Bench-
mark. Experiments conducted on a commercial database system confirm that the
17
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proposed method can survive attacks such as data re-sorting, subset selection, subset
addition etc., as well as collusion attacks.
Our approach has four novel features: (1) it is a direct sequence spread spectrum
based watermarking technique that generates a pseudo-random fingerprint for each
buyer; (2) it is robust against various attacks and has low distortion introduced to
the data values without compromising the integrity (mean and variance) of the data;
(3) it makes use of a hash table to define and later restore the order of tuples, so that
the deleted or inserted tuples will not affect the performance of watermark detection;
(4) the correctness (with low numeric distortion within tolerance)of queries (e.g. join
and project) on the database is preserved. Our proposed individualized watermarking
technique is buyer specific and thus resistant to collusion attacks. We present a
security analysis on this and show that the colluders will fail in effectively removing
the watermark. Furthermore, we have implemented our individualized watermarking
technique on a widely used database management system MySQL [25], and have
experimentally verified the robustness of our scheme using the TPC-H benchmark
data. Attacks in the form of data re-sorting, subset selection, subset addition, etc.
as well as collusion attacks were conducted, and none have caused problems to the
proposed method.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 outlines the major attacks that
a watermarking database scheme is subject to. Section 3.2 introduces the funda-
mentals of spread-spectrum and collusion-resistant watermarking. Section 3.3 refines
the algorithms in Section 3.2 in order to adapt it to watermark relational databases,
which overcomes the limitations of the previous approaches. Section 3.4 provides a de-
tailed analysis of the security of our scheme, including the robustness against common
database ownership attacks and collusion attacks. Section 3.5 presents experimental
results. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes the chapter.
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3.1 Possible Attacks
Given the peculiarities of relational databases, we first systematically outline the
possible attacks that databases watermarking may suffer. Note that an attack is
successful only if it preserves the usability of the data. The following attacks come
either in the form of benign updates by regular database update operations or the form
of malicious attacks aiming at destroying the watermark or claiming false ownership.
A1. Bit Modification: The attacker can simply update the least or least few
significant bit(s) of the entire data set. Though the attack is simple, the effect is
devastating, especially to LSB watermarking. The attack can be done by flipping all
the LSBs or setting all LSBs to ’0’ (or ’1’).
The work in [2] suffers exactly from this Attack A1, although the exact number of
LSBs watermarked is not known to the attackers.
A2. Tuple Reshuﬄe: The attacker reshuﬄes the relational database tuples.
Thus, the re-sorted data set loses synchronization with respect to the watermark
detection key, which increases the difficulty of watermark detection.
A3. Subset Selection: The attacker randomly selects or deletes a subset of the
original dataset tuples. Thus, some of the watermark bits are lost.
This attack can be understood from two opposing directions. On the one hand, the
attacker arbitrarily deletes some tuples in the hope that the mark is removed from
the remaining part. On the other hand, the attacker selects randomly a set of tuples
and wishes the selected set would not contain the mark. Interestingly, the attack
seems rendering the defense conflicting. Intuitively, the more bits we insert, the more
possible some of inserted bits are removed in the first case; in contrary, the less bits
we insert, the less possible the inserted bits exist in the second case.
Basically, A3 suggests the relative size of the set of watermarked tuples not to
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be small. Under this rationale, a sound solution unifying the above two plausibly
conflicting scenarios of defense is as the following: a mark is repeatedly inserted
many times so that a large portion of the data is watermarked.
A4. Subset Addition: The attacker adds a number of new tuples to the dataset.
This can also render the data losing synchronization in the watermark detection
phase.
A5. Attribute Projection: The attacker may project a subset of attributes that
are useful to him and create a new relational table. Thus, a number of columns are
missing and part of the watermark is destroyed after this attack.
A6. Attribute Permutation: This attack is quite simple in that the attacker
does not need to make any change to the data values, but to simply permutate the
attributes. Attribute Renaming is assumed as a special case of this attack. Similar to
AttackA2., the watermarked data lose synchronization with respect to the watermark
detection key, which renders the watermark detection more difficult.
This attack suggests that the names or sequence numbers of the attributes should
not be relied on in the detection phase. So a sound watermarking scheme should
base the recognition of an attribute on some intrinsic properties, e.g., the mean and
variance of a numeric attribute.
A7. Collusion Attack: Typically, a collusion attack has two forms:
(1) Some attackers work together to remove the watermark, so that the resulting
data are uncorrelated with the detection keys of any of these attackers.
(2) Some attackers average several copies of watermarked data, so that the resulting
data are not correlated with the detection keys of any of these attackers.
Attack A7 is more challenging than the others. There have been some proposed
solutions to this problem for multimedia data [6, 22, 10], however, the feasibility of
direct application of them to the case of watermarking relational data deserves future
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efforts.
3.2 Spread-Spectrum Watermarking
While our work here is inspired by the rigorous approach in [22], it is quite distinct
from their work, given that their scheme works only for multimedia content, and
cannot be adapted to watermark relational databases easily. Before we can describe
our individualized watermarking technique, we first give a brief introduction of the
traditional spread-spectrum mechanism.
In spread spectrum communications, a narrow-band signal is transmitted over a
much larger bandwidth such that the energy present in any single frequency is im-
perceptible [8]. It is a technique whereby an already modulated signal is modulated
a second time, in such a way that it produces a signal which interfaces in a barely
noticeable way with any other signal operating in the same frequency band. The
interfering signals are transparent to the spread spectrum signals, and the spread
spectrum signals are transparent to the interfering signals. To achieve transparency,
the spread spectrum modulation decreases the transmitted power spectral density so
that it lies well below the thermal noise level of any unfriendly receiver.
When the spread spectrum technique is applied to watermarking, the watermark
is spread over very many frequency bins (or relational data tuples in our approach)
so that the distributed energy (distortion) in any frequency bin (tuple) is very small
and thus undetectable. The watermark is therefore like a pseudo random noise which
is below the tolerance threshold and thus cannot be identified. Nevertheless, because
the watermark verification process knows of the precise location and the content of the
watermark, it is possible to concentrate these weak signals into a single signal with
a high signal-to-noise ratio. However, to destroy such a watermark would require
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noise of high amplitude to be added to all frequency bins (tuples in our case), as any
attacker who attempts to confidently eliminate the watermark, must introduce much
greater distortion to the data than the distortion from watermarking. As a result, an
attack creates obvious defects in the data.
Three schemes are commonly used for spreading in radio-frequency communica-
tions: direct sequence, frequency hopping, and chirp [8]. Since there is no frequency
domain transformation for relational data, only the direct sequence spread spectrum
(DSSS) technique is applicable here. In the DSSS scheme (which is most commonly
used for watermarking), the signal is modulated by a function that alternates pseudo-
randomly between +α and −α, a gain factor, at multiples of a time constant called
the chip rate. For relational data watermarking applications, the chip rate is the
number of times a watermark bit is replicated. The bit is modulated by a pseudo-
random carrier that contains components of all frequencies. It leads to spreading the
modulated signal’s energy over a large frequency band, rendering it undetectable at
any individual frequency (tuple). Therefore, at any frequency (tuple), the distortion
is quite low. We will now mathematically establish this process.
Let aj, where aj ∈ {−1, 1}, j = 0, 1, 2, ...,M0, be a sequence of bits, which is then
spread by a large factor cr, called the chip rate or the spread factor, to obtain the
spread sequence bi. The cr and M0 are selected in such a way that cr ×M0 = N ,
where N is the size of the host data z.
∀j : bi = aj, j · cr ≤ i < (j + 1) · cr.
The spread sequence bi is then amplified with an amplitude factor α and modulated
with a binary pseudo-noise sequence ri, where ri ∈ {−1, 1}, i = 1, 2, ..., N , yielding
the modulated signal, i.e. the watermark
ui = α · bi · ri.
CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUALIZED WATERMARKING OF DATABASES 23
Given the host data zi, i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N , the watermarked data z
′
i is computed as
follows:
z′i = zi + ui = zi + α · bi · ri, i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Due to the noisy nature of ri, ui is also a noise-like signal and thus difficult to
detect, locate and manipulate. Note that the amplitude factor α can be thought
of as the tolerance of a particular numeric attribute. The recovery of the hidden
information is easily accomplished by correlating the watermarked signal with the




ri · z′i =
(j+1)·cr−1∑
i=j·cr
ri · zi +
(j+1)·cr−1∑
i=j·cr
r2i · α · bi.
The first term on the right-hand side of the above equation vanishes if
(j+1)·cr−1∑
i=j·cr
ri · zi = 0.
Note that the pseudo-noise sequence {ri, j · cr ≤ i < (j + 1) · cr − 1} contains as
many -1’s as 1’s, and ri and zi are uncorrelated. Theoretically,
∑(j+1)·cr−1
i=j·cr ri · zi = 0.





which accounts for the different number of -1’s and 1’s in the pseudo-noise sequence,




ri · z′i +△+
(j+1)·cr−1∑
i=j·cr
r2i · α · bi ≈ 0 +
(j+1)·cr−1∑
i=j·cr
r2i · α · bi = cr · α · aj.
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Since α and cr are positive, we have
sign(Sj) = sign(cr · α · aj) = aj.
Therefore, the hidden information aj can be recovered as
aj = sign(Sj).
The above correlation is useful for watermark bits extraction. In the latter part of
this chapter, we will discuss how the technique can be used in watermark detection.
3.3 Our Approach
In this Section, we propose our individualized watermarking for Relation Databases.
Notations used in our algorithms and the analysis are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Sorting the dataset
In image watermarking, pixels have fixed relative positions. Unfortunately, the tuples
of a relational database have no defined order. However, a fixed order is necessary
to detect the embedded watermark and keep the detection phase synchronized with
the embedding phase. Thus, some invariant information in databases can help define
such an order. For our technique, we choose the primary key information for this
purpose because the primary key information usually cannot be changed or removed.
Otherwise, the database becomes significantly less useful. This is also the assumption
of the work in [2]. Therefore, we assume that it is highly unlikely that the attackers
will intentionally change or remove the primary key information of databases, as it
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Notation Description
t a tuple with schema R(P,A1, A2, ..., Aν−1)
P the primary key
sk a secret key
x the host data
N size of the host data
A standard deviation of x
w watermark sequence to establish ownership
L size of w
M number of buyers
pi pseudo-random binary sequence for the i
th buyer
ci fingerprint for the i
th buyer
B standard deviation of ci
wi individualized watermark for the ith buyer
cr the chip rate
hi spread version of wi, the detection key
τ tolerance of the host data
yi watermarked data for the i
th buyer
ŷi possibly modified version of yi
dW correlation value
gW detection noise
δW individualized watermark detection threshold
v∗ estimation attack vector
K size of collusion clique
ε1 probability of false positives
ε2 probability of false negatives
Table 3.1: Notations used in Chapter 3
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reduces the utility of the database information.
We assume that a standard cryptographic hash function like SHA-1 or MD-5
can be used to establish order [31, 2]. Given a database relation R with schema
R(P,A1, A2, ..., Aν−1), where P is the primary key, the hash value F (t ·P ) of primary
key attribute P of tuple t can be computed using:
F (t.P ) = H(sk ◦H(sk ◦ t.P )),
where sk is a secret key and H is a cryptographic hash function like SHA-1 or MD-5,
and ◦ denotes concatenation. The hash values can then help define the order of the
tuples of the relational data. We store the hash values in a table, which should be
maintained for the future watermark detection need.
There is a primary key replacement attack, such that the attacker simply hashes
the primary key and makes use of the hash value to replace the primary key. In
the way, the primary key is still unique for each tuple, which makes the database
suitable for some application. All the existing techniques are subject to this attack.
However, as we previously assumed, the modification of primary key will render the
data significantly less useful. Especially when the primary keys carries meanings
instead of merely serving as ID’s, this attack will make the primary keys totally
meaningless. Moreover, when join operations are applied on two or more tables,
improper modification of primary keys or foreign keys will introduce great errors
to the join results. In short, attackers can hardly benefit from this primary key
replacement attack.
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3.3.2 Embedding Phase
Like [2], our technique watermarks and fingerprints only the numeric attributes.
Without loss of generality, assume the first k numeric attributes A1, A2, ..., Ak are
candidate of watermarking and fingerprinting. Figure 3.1 outlines the individualized
watermark embedding algorithm.
Let w be a sequence of binary values {−1, 1} of size L. w is for the purpose of
establishing ownership, and it is the same for all the buyers. We assume that one
buyer corresponds to one copy of relational data sold. Let C = {cij} be a M × L
matrix, where M is the number of buyers, and cij ∈ R, cij = N(0, B2), i.e. each
entry is a zero-mean normal random variable with standard deviation σc = B. Let
P = {pij} be a M × L matrix of pseudo-random binary values, where pij ∈ {−1, 1}.
For each buyer i, pi is distinct for this buyer and is uncorrelated with any other
buyer’s sequence pj, ∀j : i 6= j. To guarantee this, good pseudo-random sequences
possessing certain properties in terms of sequence length, auto-correlation, cross-
correlation, orthogonality, and bit balancing are recommended. For example, good
pseudo-random sequences like M-sequence and Gold sequence of length 31 [28] can
be used.
The individualized watermark sequence wi (here pi, ci and wi all denote sequences,
instead of bits)can be computed as:
wi = pi · w + ci.
Note that the goal of the watermark carrier ci is to hide the watermark w, and the
goal of pi is to further de-correlate the different wi’s.
Then we spread the individualized watermark sequence wi by the chip rate cr, such
that the spread watermark hi is of size N = cr · L, where N is the size of the host
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data x (i.e. the sequence of numeric attributes selected to be watermarked). Each
window of wi corresponds to one watermarking block. In total, we have cr blocks.
We then embed the spread individualized watermark hi into the host data x, where
x is relational data sorted by the above sorting algorithm, to obtain the watermarked






where τ denotes the tolerance of the host data. We assume τ is the maximum dis-
tortion that the numeric attribute of the tuple can survive without compromising
the integrity of the data. Note that for different relational data, τ can be different.
Even for the different columns in the same table, τ can be varied as well. Note that
up to cr number of copies of the individualized watermark wi are embedded into
the relational data. Since we choose factor cr as large as possible, we maximize the
spreading of the embedded watermark bits wi. This results in the advantages of the
spread spectrum technique which increases robustness (against various attacks) with
low distortion introduced into the host data.
Individualized Watermark Embedding Algorithm:
Input: sorted relation R with schema R(P,A1, A2, ..., Aν−1), number of tuples N , owner-
ship sequence w and its length L, ith pseudo random sequence ci and pi
Output: new relation R′ with individualized watermark, chip rate cr
Method:
1: compute the individualized watermark wi for user i, wi = piw + ci
2: chip rate cr = floor(N/L)
3: ∀m : m (mod L) = n, set him = win
4: for each j ← 1 to N do
5: for each l← 1 to k do
6: compute the watermarked data A′j l = Aj l +
τ
2 hij




k, Ak+1, ..., Aν−1), cr
Figure 3.1: Individualized Watermark Embedding Algorithm
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3.3.3 Detection Phase
We now describe the watermark detection process. Note that we assume the scenario
wherein several copies of the relational data are sold to different buyers, each copy
embedded with a distinct buyer fingerprint ci and the ownership watermark w mod-
ulated by pi. In case of piracy or ownership dispute, the watermark and fingerprint
need to be detected in a possibly modified copy of the watermarked relational data.
Figure 3.2 outlines the individualized watermark detection algorithm. The algo-
rithm consists of 2 phases. Phase 1 re-sorts the tuples of a suspected copy of relational
data according to the hash function and kept hash table. Phase 2 scans all the tuples
in re-sorted order, and computes the correlation value between the suspected data ŷi
and the corresponding detection key wi to determine traitor(s). In the following, we
describe the two phases in detail.
Semi-blind Re-sorting Scheme
Note that the suspected copy of the relational data can be a modified version ŷi of
the original watermarked data yi, which may be caused by distortion due to benign
updates or malicious attacks. The primary key of each tuple is hashed by the same
hash function used in the watermark embedding phase, and the hash value is com-
pared with the kept hash table to check if the current tuple is present in the table.
If it is present, the tuple is recovered in the order that the hash function indicates.
Otherwise, the current tuple is a newly-inserted one which does not exist in our orig-
inal table, so we simply skip and ignore it. After checking all the tuples in ŷi, all the
tuples that were present in the original database, are sorted and ready for detection
purpose.
Since we use the hash table to recover the original order and ignore the newly-
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Individualized Watermark Detection Algorithm:





k, Ak+1, ..., Aν−1), chip rate cr, suspected buyer ID l and corre-
sponding detection key wl
Output: buyer ID l if the lth buyer pirates
Method:
phase 1: database re-sorting
1: for each tuple t ∈ R′ do
2: compute F (t.P ) = H(sk ◦H(sk ◦ t.P ))
3: scan the kept Hash table
4: if F (t.P ) is in the table then
5: restore its order by F (t.P )
6: retrieve the corresponding watermarking bit in wi
7: mark isnew = 0
8: mark isnew = 1 /* this tuple is new*/
phase 2: scan all tuples and compute correlation
1: initiate the counts count+ = 0
2: for each tuple t in the re-sorted order do
3: for each watermarking block i← 0 to cr − 1 do
4: for each tuple j ← L× i+ 1 to L× (i+ 1) do
5: if isnew = 0 then
6: current tuple is involved in the calculation of correlation dW with detection
key bit wi[j (modL)]
7: else
8: skip current tuple
9: if dW > δW then
10: count+ = count+ + 1
11: if count+ >
1
2 · cr then
12: return traitor ID l
13: else
14: return 0
Figure 3.2: Individualized Watermark Detection Algorithm
inserted tuples, it is not necessary to compare the current database with the original
one. However, we have to maintain the hash values of the original tuples for re-sorting
purpose. Therefore, our scheme can be considered as a semi-blind watermarking
detection scheme [7] (differing from absolutely blind watermarking scheme, where no
information from the original data needs to be maintained), which makes our scheme
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more competent for real database applications.
Correlation-based Watermark Detection
Given the sorted watermarked data ŷi (possibly attacked), we can compute the cor-
relation of the watermarked data with the watermark detection key wi = piw + ci.
Note that we compute the correlation for each watermarking block. For each block,
we compute dW = ŷi · wi and compare it with the detection threshold δW .
If the corresponding tuple of a watermark bit has been deleted, we ignore the tuple
and the corresponding bit in wi. Therefore, the number of bits in wi involved in the
correlation computation may be less than or equal to the actual length of wi, due to
the possible delete operations in the database. If the correlation value is greater than
the detection threshold, i.e. dW > δW , then the watermark wi = piw+ci is considered
to be present. Otherwise, the watermark does not exist in that copy of the relational
data.
Since we embed individualized watermark in all the k numeric attributesA1, A2, ..., Ak,
we can actually compute k correlation values {dWn , n = 1, 2, ..., k} for each watermark-
ing block. Thus, we can choose the maximum value in {dWn , n = 1, 2, ..., k} as the
value of dW , i.e.
dW = max(dWn),∀n : n = 1, 2, .., k.
Also, as we embed the individualized watermark wi = piw+ci up to cr times in the
host data, we can compute cr number of dW for all the watermarking blocks. Then
we can apply a majority voting scheme to decide whether the watermark is present
or not.
In the event that collusion attack occurs, we apply phase 2 of the detection algo-
rithm to all the suspected buyers’ detection keys. Thus, we can detect the traitors
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(malicious buyers) who took part in the collusion attack.
The major advantage of our scheme is that we can establish the ownership and
detect the real colluders, even if the attackers collude and tamper the watermark
information. In the following section, we will present the formal security analysis.
3.4 Security Analysis
If there are no malicious attacks or benign updates, we denote the watermarked





where τ denotes the tolerance which is the amount of distortion that the content
can survive. Note that τ can vary according to different relational data and different
numeric attributes. Let wi = piw + ci denote the corresponding detection key for yi.
We denote correlation between yi and wi as dW = yi · wi, which is the normalized
inner product of vectors yi and wi. For instance,
a · b = 1‖ a ‖‖ b ‖
∑
aibi,
with a2 = a · a.
Let δW be the watermark detection threshold, which decides that the watermark
is present if dW > δW . Basically, δW controls the trade-off between the probabilities
of false positives and false negatives, i.e. for equal probability of false positives and
false negatives, we should set δW = 1/2 (refer to [22]).
Let vi be the attacker’s estimated version of wi. The closer the estimated vi is to
wi , the more successful is the attacker in eliminating the watermark.
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For watermark detection, let ε1 denote the probability of false positives, which is the
probability of wrongly identifying an unwatermarked copy of the data as watermarked.
For the sake of the credibility and security of our scheme, ε1 must be kept very small
with a typical value of ε1 = 10
−9.
Let ε2 denote the probability of false negatives, which is the probability of not
identifying a colluder. We would like ε2 to be small as well, but do not have to insist
that ε2 is as small as ε1.
3.4.1 Watermark Removal Attack
Assume the pseudo-random number generator is secure (i.e. PRNG can not be at-
tacked by attackers), let us consider the case where the attacker has broken the water-
mark detection key wl = plw+ cl for client l. Since the attacker does not know which
copy yl = x+
τ
2
(plw+cl) the detection key wl corresponds to, he/she is likely to utilize
wl to estimate the watermark wi = piw+ci for the buyer i, where it is with high prob-
ability that l 6= i. The attacker estimates the detection key vi = αwl = α(plw + cl),
where α ∈ R. The attacker removes vi and creates a new version of relational data
content by:
ŷi = yi − vi = yi − αwl = x+ τ
2
(piw + ci)− α(plw + cl).
In order to deceive the detector that the watermark is not present in the attacker’s
modified data, the attacker would like to lower the correlation value given by dW =
ŷ · wi:
dW = ŷi · wi = [x+ τ
2
(piw + ci)− α(plw + cl)] · (piw + ci).
Note that we assume the fingerprint part ci follows a zero-mean Gaussian probability
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distribution with the standard deviation σ = B. For the sake of simplicity of analysis,
we set τ = 2.
If somehow, by sheer chance, the attacker has the knowledge of ŷl = x+plw+cl and
corresponding wl, he can simply remove the watermark, i.e ŷl = x+plw+cl−α(plw+cl)
to drive E[dW ] = 0. In this case, it is obvious that the attacker need to set α = 1.
Therefore, even if the attacker does not know ŷl = x+
τ
2
(plw + cl), he will set α = 1
as well.
Given α = 1, the correlation value becomes:
dW = ŷi · wi = [x+ τ
2
(piw + ci)− (plw + cl)] · (piw + ci),
and its expect value can be computed as E[dW ] = 1 + B
2, which is already large
enough for us to detect the existence of wi.
Thus, it is apparent that even with the knowledge of hl = plw + cl, the attacker
will not be able to remove watermark wi from some copy of the watermarked data yi,
where i 6= l.
In essence, the attacker cannot succeed in the watermark removal attack.
3.4.2 The Collusion Attack
Consider a collusion clique of size K. Assume that the attacker(s) have broken K
detection keys {wi = piw + ci, i = 1, 2, ..., K}, but do not know how these detection
keys correspond to the watermarked data {yi, i = 1, 2, ...,M,M >> K}. Or in
another type of attack, K legitimate buyers collude together to defeat our watermark
detection. Since the attackers will either fail in removing the individualized watermark
or make the data useless, we assume that the attackers’ real goal is to not to totally
remove the watermark, but to make the attackers’ modified version ŷi = yi − vi
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uncorrelated with any of the colluders’ detection keys {wi = piw+ ci, i = 1, 2, ..., K},
so that the colluders cannot be caught.
Watermark Estimation Attack
With the knowledge of K detection keys {wi, i = 1, 2, ..., K}, the attacker would like
to best estimate the attack vector v∗, in a manner such that ŷi = yi−v∗ does not show
significant correlation with any of watermark detection keys {wi}, even for i > K.
We will now show that even with the knowledge of K detection keys {wi, i =
1, 2, ..., K}, it is still difficult for the attackers to estimate a good attack vector v∗.
We name the use of the estimate v∗ as Watermark Estimation Attack.








Proof: Watermark estimation attack aims to find a vector v∗ that minimizes the
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Collusion Size to Defeat Watermark Detection
Given the concept of watermark estimation attack, we now prove that the attackers
(or colluders) will fail in effectively removing the watermark and thereby defeating
the watermark detection.
Lemma 3.4.2 Given K detection keys {wi = piw + ci, i = 1, 2, ..., K}, in order to
reduce the correlation value to E[dW ] < θ, where θ < 1 +B
2, Condition 1 must hold.
Condition 1: the K keys must contain the detection key wl for the attacker’s copy
yl = x+ wl.
Proof: First, assume that wl is not in the K detection keys {wi = piw + ci, i =
1, 2, ..., K}. By using the watermark estimation attack, the attacker’s version is













i=1 ci)(plw+ cl) and l 6= i, i =
1, 2, ..., K, we can compute E[dW ] = 1+B
2 > θ, so that the attackers will be caught in
piracy and collusion. Therefore, Condition 1 must be satisfied in order for the attack
to succeed. [QED]
To ensure Condition 1, it is obvious that a relatively large K is desired. However,
the larger K is, the more likely it is that the collusion clique will be betrayed by one
of the colluders. Also, it is more difficult and expensive to make a collusion clique of
a larger size.
As a result of the above contradiction, the attackers cannot succeed in removing
watermark by collusion attack.
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Averaging Collusion Attack
Lemma 3.4.3 Given K different buyers’ watermarked relational data, in order to
reduce the correlation value to E[dW ] < θ after the averaging attack, the collusion




Proof: Assume that attackers average K different buyers’ data to obtain a new ver-








i=1 ci. We would like to
use the detection keys {wi = piw + ci, i = 1, 2, ..., K} to detect the existence of the
watermark, i.e.














Clearly, the smaller the value of θ is, the larger is the collusion size K required. For
a given θ value, the minimum collusion size grows proportional to B2. For example,
if θ = 0.2, then B2 = 0.8, the attackers need to average K > 9 copies. For θ = 0.2,
B2 = 2, the attackers have to average K > 15 copies.
Also note that the larger the collusion size K is, the more likely it is that the
collusion clique will be betrayed by one of the colluders. So usually the attackers
aim to keep the clique size as small as possible, e.g. K ≤ 3. These above two facts
contradict each other. Therefore, our scheme is resistant to such a collusion attack.
Thus, from Lemma 3.4.2 and Lemma 3.4.3, we can conclude that the collusion
attack is highly unlikely to succeed.
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3.4.3 Probability of False Positives
In this section, we would like to estimate the probability of falsely detecting a wa-
termark when there does not exist any. For this purpose, we compute the detection
noise gW , which is defined as dW = 1 + gW if ŷi was marked; and dW = 0 + gW ,
otherwise. We assume gW to have a zero-mean Gaussian distribution. If there are no
attacks, then
dW = yi · wi = (x+ piw + ci) · (piw + ci) = 1 + gW .
Therefore, gW = x ·pi ·w+x · ci+2pi ·w · ci+ ci2. Since gW has a normal distribution,
it can be shown that the detection noise variance is
σgW
2 = (A2 + 2B2 + 5A2B2 + 5B4)/N
where A is the standard deviation of the host data, and N is the size of the host
data. For a given value of σgW , we can now calculate the probability of false positives
ε1 = Pr[ dW > gW | dataset is not marked ] as follows:








2(A2 + 2B2 + 5A2B2 + 5B4)
),
where erfc(·) is the complementary error function [22].
From Corollary 3.4.1, we can observe that to achieve a given ε1, with the increase of
N , we should lower the detection threshold δW . However, since our scheme assumes
a very low value for ε1 (i.e. ε1 = 10
−9), N does not affect δW much in practice.
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3.4.4 Database Update Attacks
We have summarized the possible database attacks, and discussed how our water-
marking scheme can preserve join result in the previous sections, now we brief how
these attacks can be defeat-able using our watermarking technique.
A1. Bit Modification
The work in [2] suffers exactly from this attack. Our individualized watermarking
technique is resistant to this attack because we apply spread-spectrum watermarking
instead of relying on LSB method.
A2. Tuple Reshuﬄe
It is obvious that with the re-sorting algorithm, the tuples of the relational database
can be re-sorted and thus the synchronization can be restored. Therefore, Attack A2
can be defeated.
A3. Subset Selection
As we maintain the hash table for detection purpose, both the deleted and newly
inserted tuples can be recognized. Since detection phase is correlation based, and we
embed as many copies of the same watermark as possible in each watermarked copy
and utilize a majority-voting scheme, the delete or insert updates do not affect the
watermark detection result that much. Therefore, Attack A3 can also be overcome.
A4. Subset Addition
Similar to Attack A3, Attack A4 can be defeated.
A5. Attribute Projection
Because we can always recognize the attributes we have selected for watermarking,
we can easily know if some of the watermarked columns have been dropped. As long
as not all the watermarked columns are dropped, we can still detect the existence
of individualized watermark. We assume that no attacker will drop all the numeric
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columns as it will render the relational data significantly less useful. Therefore, Attack
A5 can be defeated as well.
A6. Attribute Permutation
Attack A6 is similar to Attack A2. For the detection purpose, we need to restore
the sequence of the attributes in the relation. Since our technique preserves the mean
and variance of the data, we can use this information to recognize the watermarked
columns. Also, as our watermarking is column-independent, permuting attributes
does not really affect the watermark detection.
A7. Collusion Attack
The two forms of collusion attack have been discussed in detail earlier.
3.5 Experimental Study
In this section, we present the experimental results to complement the theoretical
analysis in the previous section. Our experiments were performed on the relational
databases generated based on the TPC-H Benchmark, which has been designed to
evaluate the performance of decision support systems by executing sets of queries
against a standard database under controlled conditions. The database generated
consists of 8 tables, each of which has a primary key or composite primary keys. The
primary key or composite primary keys can be used for the tuple re-sorting purpose.
The schema of the tables is illustrated in Appendix. We embed watermark all the
tables except for table NATION and REGION, which have no numeric attributes.
We apply the individualized watermark embedding algorithm to these tables. For
each buyer, we apply the algorithm with a distinct individualized watermarking se-
quence. Then we use the detection algorithm to establish the ownership and track
malign buyers when piracy occurs.
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All our experiments were performed on a PC with Pentium IV 1.6Ghz CPU, 256
MB of memory, and a 20 GB hard disk drive. The watermark embedding and de-
tection algorithm were coded in Java. The feasibility of the watermarked databases
against standard databases is verified by Relational DBMS MySQL. As we embed
watermark in data domain, the watermark embedding and detection phases can both
be run in linear time O(N), where N is the size of host data (i.e. the number of
tuples watermarked or the number of tuples involved in the detection phase). In our
experiment, we set the length of individualized watermark L = 100 and vary the
tolerance parameter τ = 0.05 ∼ 1.0 for different tables.
3.5.1 Query Validation
First of all, we should be able to show the imperceptibility of our individualized
watermarking scheme, that is the watermarked databases should remain useful upon
querying. Thus, we validate the watermarked databases by comparing the query
results with the query results of standard unmarked databases.
There are twenty-two decision support queries in total as defined in the TPC-H
Benchmark. All these queries were executed using the suggested parameters and
produced satisfactory output data. If the query does not involve the watermarked
column, obviously the watermarked database produces the same output data as the
standard database. Even when we query on the watermarked columns, experiments
show that output data are of small numerical difference (within the distortion toler-
ance) from the standard database.























Figure 3.3: Varying the percentage of tuples watermarked
3.5.2 Setting Watermark Detection Threshold
Having established the utility of the watermarked database, we now present the ex-
perimental results of robustness of our individualized watermarking algorithm. We
present the experimental results of one table out of the 6 tables, i.e. Table SUP-
PLIER. Table SUPPLIER consists of 10,000 tuples, each with 7 attributes. We
embed individualized watermark in the numeric attribute SUPPLIER.ACCTBAL.
The parameters used were L = 100, τ = 1.0.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the percentage of correct votes with various detection thresh-
old δW , under the condition that there are no attacks.
We can see that setting the watermark detection threshold at δW = 0.3, we can
safely get over 50% correct votes (so as to correctly indicate the presence of the
watermark), with percentage of tuples watermarked varying from 20% to 100%.
Figure 3.4 illustrates under the condition that when there are no attacks, the
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percentage of correct votes with various threshold δW , plotted against various chip
rate cr = 20 ∼ 100. From figure 3.4, we can see that setting the threshold δW = 0.3,























Figure 3.4: Varying the chip rate cr
Figure 3.4 also shows that the percentage of correct votes increases with the in-
crease of the chip rate cr. Therefore, a larger cr is preferred. Given 10,000 tu-
ples and watermark sequence of length L = 100, the chip rate can be as large as
cr = 10000/100 = 100, with the percentage of tuples watermarked reaching 100%. In
our following experiments, we set cr = 100.
Note that the most damaging failure in the watermark embedding and detection
phases is the probability of false positives ε1, i.e. incriminating a buyer who did not
participate in the collusion. From Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, we conclude that by
setting δW = 0.3 (or higher), we can almost drive ε1 = 0. That is, the proposed
method is robust against false positive errors.
In the following sections, we present watermark detection results after various at-
tacks have been applied to the watermarked data. The parameters used are N =
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10000, L = 100, cr = 100 and τ = 1.0.
3.5.3 Performance Against Attacks
Subset Selection Attack
Figure 3.5 presents the percentage of correct votes obtained when various percentages
of tuples have been randomly deleted. Note that our scheme defines a secret order
for the tuples, such that we can recognize which tuples have been deleted and which
are newly-inserted. In both cases, these tuples are not involved in the calculation of
correlation values. Therefore, the percentage of correct votes is affected little by the
increase in the percentage of deleted tuples. We can see that even with up to 90%
of tuples deleted, we can still detect the watermark with the watermark detection
























Figure 3.5: Varying the percentage of tuples deleted
Similarly, with the insertion of new tuples or attributes, the correlation value will
not be affected either, since we always know which tuples or attributes are new
and thus do not involve them in the correlation calculation. Therefore, even if the
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attackers insert a large number of tuples or attributes, our detection scheme will still
work. However, it is obvious that too many insertions of useless tuples or attributes
will make the relational data lose value, which is not desirable from the attackers’
point of view.
Project Operation Attack
Often, the attackers project only a subset of watermarked columns. As there are
too small number of columns available for watermarking in Table SUPPLIER and
the other tables generated by TPC-H Benchmark, we experiment Project Operation
Attack on another dataset named Ovarian Cancer 1. The dataset consists of 253 in-
stances (tuples), each with 15,154 attributes (all numeric). We add an extra attribute
( column with all the values distinct from each other) to serve as the primary key for
the purposes of re-sorting tuples. We select 100 numeric attributes as candidates to
be watermarked.
We can consider the Project Operation Attack equivalent to deleting columns. The
fewer columns we project, the more columns are considered to be deleted. As long as
not all of the 100 watermarked attributes are deleted, the individualized watermark
can still be detected from the remaining columns.
Figure 3.6 presents the percentage of correct votes with various percentages of
watermarked columns deleted. Again, we can see that the watermark detection phase
works well with up to 90% of the attributes deleted.
Collusion Attacks
As we proved in the previous section, with a small collusion clique size, the attackers
will fail to eliminate the watermark. On the other hand, it is almost impractical to
1National Cancer Institute, http://clinicalproteomics.steem.com/

























Figure 3.6: Varying the percentage of watermarked columns deleted
achieve a large collusion clique.
With a collusion size of K = 5, we can see that the attacker’s copy obtained from
averaging collusion attacks still shows significant correlation with the detection keys
in the collusion clique, namely {wi, i = 1, 2, ..., 5}.
Figure 3.7 shows the correlation median of the attacked data over the 5 colluded
detections keys. We compute the median of correlation values because if the median
is greater than the detection threshold δW , then the percentage of correct votes is over
50%, which is good enough to confirm the presence of the individualized watermark.
We can observe that even after averaging K = 5 different copies of the relational
database, the correlation median values show no apparent decrease and mostly remain
greater than the detection threshold, except for the correlation median of colluder 3
with 20% tuples watermarked. But as long as we can find the majority of the colluders
within a collusion clique, it is highly likely that we can get to know the whole clique.
Therefore, with our individualized watermark embedding and detection technique,
the colluders can be precisely and reliably identified.
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Figure 3.7: Median of correlation values after collusion attack of size K = 5
Even after increasing the collusion clique size to K = 10, we could still detect
the watermark. This demonstrates that our technique is indeed robust against the
collusion attack.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed the problem of protecting digital rights of relational
data under the buyer-seller scenario where the same data are sold to several buyers.
We have articulated the need for collusion resistance and thus the need for individually
fingerprinting each copy of the data sold. We then proposed a novel individualized
watermarking method in which we utilized a direct sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS)
based approach for distinctly watermarking every copy of the data. The proposed
mechanism can survive a wide variety of attacks, such as data re-sorting, subset
selection, subset addition etc., as well as collusion attacks. We gave a formal security
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analysis as well as the experimental results on a real-life dataset to show the robustness
of our technique against various attacks. The validation of the join results shows that
the distortions introduced by our technique are within the tolerance of the relational
data.
Our scheme supports up to 2L distinct buyers. When the number of buyers is small,
a general pseudo-random number generator works well. However, when the number
of buyers increases, it is necessary to use good pseudo-random sequences possessing
certain properties, in terms of sequence length, auto-correlation, cross-correlation,
orthogonality, and bit balancing. For these concerns, good pseudo-random sequences,




In many applications, i.e. medical, military, satellite etc., it’s important for a legit-
imate user to verify the integrity of the data before using it, because inaccuracy in
these data will not only render the data useless but result in vicious effects. Inaccu-
rate data are unacceptable, while free redistribution of the data should be prohibited.
Unfortunately, most approaches of copyright protection modify the data to some ex-
tent. Therefore, when precision-critical data are sold, a trade-off must be achieved
between precision and integrity of the data on one hand and copyright protection on
the other. In this case, traditional watermarking as a currently wide-used solution
for protecting copyright is incompetent, and invertible (or lossless, reversible) water-
marking is therefore required. Invertible watermarking has been introduced in the
literature for image watermarking and authentication. In this chapter, we present
an invertible watermarking scheme for precision-critical databases. The data can be
recovered fully or partially with the legitimate users presenting the secret key, while
being totally meaningless to the non-privileged users.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives the problem specification of
this chapter. Section 4.2 introduces a naive LSB approach to invertible watermarking
of databases. Section 4.3 presents a more decent spread-spectrum based invertible
watermarking of databases. Section 4.4 addresses multi-level access. Experimental
study is given in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes the chapter.
4.1 Problem Specification
Watermarking as a most widely used solution for copyright protection has been de-
veloped well for image, audio and video etc. signals. Relatively few works have been
published for database watermarking. [2, 30] present idea of watermarking relational
database respectively. In the previous chapter, we gave out a novel watermarking
scheme that can trace pirate and survives collusion attacks. All these work [2, 30]
are based on watermarking techniques that modify the data values more or less, and
recovery of the original data is impossible. For example, in [1], the authors assumed:
“the decrease in the value of the data is small enough that the owner is
willing to pay this price in exchange for that ability to assert ownership.”
However, for some applications, such as medical, military and satellite informa-
tion, the integrity of the data is important. Reasons are obvious: medical data are
used for disease diagnosis, and any inaccuracy can potentially harm the patient and
can even lead to death. Similarly, satellite data are used to locate military strate-
gic targets or to forecast weather, thus inaccurate data may be totally useless. In
[14], an invertible watermarking for JPEG images authentication is presented. The
assumption that original images have been lossy-compressed is a drawback. Even
after the watermark is removed, the result is still lossy-compressed image. In [13],
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Fridrich et al improved the idea and applied it to watermark all image formats. [9]
present a spread-spectrum invertible watermarking system for authenticating images
in lossless formate. The integrity of the images can be verified and original images
before embedding watermark can be recovered. [10] also proposed a spread-spectrum
watermarking scheme for rights management of broadcast video. The methodology
in [10] and [9] are similar to some extent. Philosophically, we would like to adopt this
idea of invertible watermarking to watermark precision-critical database.
However, invertible watermarking of databases has been made more difficult than
invertible watermarking images for the reasons that have been discussed in chapter 3.
The particular properties of databases must be taken into account when watermarking
the relations.
For a probable application of invertible watermarking databases, we assume that
different users may have different levels of access. Multi-level access can be defined
in such a way that:
1. General users: can only see watermarked version of the data.
2. Read-only users: are allowed to remove the watermarks partially or fully (de-
fined by the different levels of clearance).
3. Administrators: not only can read the watermark-free data, but also can update
the data.
Assumption: Read-only users are a small group of users to whom the owner of the
data trusts to some extent. Administrators have permission to update the data, and
delete and insert items, and are even fewer in number.
In this Chapter, we take two different approaches for invertible watermarking
databases: One is a LSB watermarking technique, and the other is a spread-spectrum
technique.
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4.2 A Naive Approach
In this section, we present an invertible watermarking technique based on LSB (Least
Significant Bit).
Given a database tuple t with schema (P,A1, A2, ..., Aν), let t.P denote its pri-
mary key. Without loss of generality, assume that A1, A2, ..., Ak are candidates for
watermarking, where Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ k are numeric attributes.
Let LSBn(Ai) be the n
th least significant bit of Ai. Here we assume that we only
modify LSB1(Ai). We use a standard cryptographic hash function to determine the
watermark bits for tuple t. Let the hash value be
F (t.P ) = H(K ◦H(K ◦ t.P )),
where K is a secret key, and H is a hash function like SHA-1 or MD-5.
The watermarking rules are as follow:
H1: t.Ai remains intact, if F (t.p) is even;
H2: LSB1(t.Ai) is flipped, otherwise.
Because we keep the hash function H only known to the privileged users, non-
privileged users do not know which LSBs have been flipped.
In the watermark removal phase, we compute hash value again, and recover the
original data as follow:
H1: t.Ai remains intact, if F (t.p) is even;
H2: LSB1(t.Ai) is flipped, otherwise.
We can observe that the watermark removal is just the same as the watermarking
phase. This naive approach based on LSB technique is simple and effective with high
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accuracy. However, it may not be a perfect solution to protect the precision-critical
databases, because its security entirely relies on the security of the hash function,
and once the hash function is disclosed or tried out, the data will be fully exposed to
piracy. Therefore, in the next section, we will present a scheme that is more elegant
and secure.
4.3 Spread-spectrum Approach
Given the deficiency of the naive approach, in this section we discuss how spread-
spectrum watermarking technique can be used for invertible watermarking databases.
4.3.1 Preliminary
First, we propose the fundamentals of the spread-spectrum watermarking technique,
and how it can be invertible.
Watermark Embedding
The original data signal is xi, i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N , and the copyright information is a
binary sequence aj ∈ {−1, 1}, where j = 0, 1, 2, ...,M . We spread aj with chip-rate
cr to obtain the spread sequence bi as follows:
∀j: bi = aj, j · cr ≤ i < (j + 1) · cr,
where cr is a large factor selected in such a way that cr ×M = N . The spreading
provides redundancy of the watermark information and improves the robustness in
watermark extracting and removal phase. Then the spread sequence is multiplied
with a pseudo-random noise sequence {pi} and the amplitude (also called amplitude
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or tolerance factor αi, where pi ∈ {−1, 1}, and α > 0, such that the watermarked
signal is computed as
yi = xi + αi · pi · bi.
Watermark Detection
Watermark inversion (detection and removal) is performed by demodulating the wa-
termarked signal yi with the same pseudo-noise sequence pi used in the embedding
phase. The original unwatermarked data is not required for the detection. We mul-
tiply the watermarked signal yi by the pseudo-noise sequence pi over each window of
the embedded watermark information. Let ŷi be probably modified version of yi. In
fact, in the applications proposed in this chapter, yi is not likely to be maliciously
changed to ŷi by non-privileged users as they do not have access right and any im-
proper update may render the data useless. Correlation summation sj is calculated
over each window of the embedded watermark information aj as following:
sj =
∑(j+1)·cr−1
i=j·cr pi · ŷi
=
∑(j+1)·cr−1




i · αi · bi
≈ ∑(j+1)·cr−1i=j·cr p2i · αi · bi.
Note that
∑(j+1)·cr−1
i=j·cr pi · xi = 0 if pseudo-noise sequence pi and original signal xi are
uncorrelated.
The extracted watermark information âj (where extracted âj may be different from
the original aj due to distortion or inevitable correlation between pi and xi for real
data), can be interpreted by the sign of sj, as





i · αi · bi)
= sign(
∑(j+1)·cr−1
i=j·cr αi · aj)
= sign(aj ·∑αi/cr).
Since amplitude factor αi is a positive number, we have
sign(sj) = aj.
Thus, the embedded watermark information aj can be extracted from the correlation
summation with high probability of correctness.
Note that the amplitude factor αi used in embedding phase must also be known.
To easily meet this requirement and simplify the calculation, we set αi to a constant
value α.
Watermark Removal
We can then remove the watermark from the data to achieve the watermark-free data
as follows:
x̂ = ŷ − α · bi · pi.
Obviously, if the embedded bits aj are correctly recovered (when âj = aj), the
watermark-cleaned data will match the original data, i.e. x̂ = x, if ∀i, âj = aj.
Note that the pseudo-noise sequence pi and amplitude factor α (or αi) must be
known in order to remove the watermark and view the watermark-free data. Only
the privileged users (Read-only users and Administrators) can know pi and αi. Non-
privileged users (Guests) have no knowledge of pi and αi, and thus have no access to
the original data.
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4.3.2 Invertible Watermarking of Relational Databases
The above mentioned method can work well for image watermarking, but is not
directly applicable to watermarking of databases. The problems to be solved include
the lack of ordering of the tuples and the update, delete and insert of the tuples.










Database X* Watermark removal
EmbeddingOriginalDatabase X
Figure 4.1: Watermarking Embedding and Removal
Sorting Database Tuples
In image watermarking, pixels have fixed relative positions. Unfortunately, the tuples
of a relational database has no defined order. However, a fixed order is necessary to
detect the embedded watermark and keep the detection phase synchronized with the
embedding sequence. Thus, some invariant information in databases can help define
such an order. For our technique, we choose the primary key information (for example
tuple ID) for the re-sorting purpose. Note that in our application assumption, only
Administrators have access to remove or update the tuples, and Administrations will
not maliciously modify the primary key information.
Let R be a database relation with schema R(P,A1, A2, ..., Aν), where R is the pri-
mary key. We use a standard cryptographic hash function like SHA-1 or MD-5 for the
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purpose of establishing order [31], because the hash function has desirable properties
such as: (1) They are one-way function, i.e. given a hash value, it is computational
impossible to find the corresponding input. (2) It is computational impossible to find
two inputs that yield the same hash value. With these two properties, the primary
key information can be hashed to define a unique order of the tuples of the relational
data. The hash value F (t ·P ) of primary key attribute P of tuple t is computed using:
F (t · P ) = H(K ◦H(K ◦ t · P ))
where K is a secret key, H is a cryptographic hash function, and ◦ denotes concate-
nation. We maintain the hash table for the watermark detection needs.
Note that our method is not constrained to single table query, as it can also be
applied to complex queries across multiple tables. However, the primary key and
foreign keys should not be absent from watermarking, since improper modification of
these attributes will introduce great errors to join result.
Embedding Phase
In [2, 30], only the numeric attributes can be watermarked. But in our approach,
both numeric and non-numeric attributes can be used to embed watermark. Let
the original relation R have schema R(P,A1, A2, ..., Aν). Without loss of generality,
assume the first k attribute A1, A2, ..., Ak are the candidates to be watermarked.
For the sake of simplicity, in the algorithm below we only watermark attribute A1,
i.e. xi = A1,i. To watermark more attributes, we can simply apply the embedding
algorithm to these attributes respectively.
Figure 4.2 presents the invertible watermarking algorithm.
We embed the watermark bits bi, i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N , combined with the pseudo-noise
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pi and amplitude factor α into the original data xi, according to the tuples order
defined in the above re-sorting algorithm,
yi = xi + α · pi · bi.
Note that the pseudo-random number sequences pi is generated from some
For simplicity of calculation, we assume that for all the columns to be watermarked
in one table, we use the same pseudo-noise sequence pi and bi. Note that multiple
versions of bi can be embedded into the original data, given different orthogonal
pi sequences. We replicate copyright information aj number of cr times, to get a
block of bi = aj spreading the watermark bits. This nature of spread-spectrum
watermarking improves the robustness of the watermarks (against attacks) and leads
to high probability of correctness in watermark extraction phase with low distortion
of attribute data values.
Invertible Watermarking Embedding:
Input: original data xi, secret key sk, binary sequence aj , j < i, amplitude factor α
Output: watermarked data yi
Method:
1: Generate pseudo-noise sequence pi with secret key sk;
2: Duplicate aj with chip-rate cr to generate a binary sequence bi = aj , j · cr ≤ i <
(j + 1) · cr;
3: for each i← to N do
4: Compute the new value yi = xi + α · pi · bi;
5: return yi
Figure 4.2: Invertible Watermarking Embedding
Table 4.1 outlines the information we need to keep for watermark extraction and
removal phase. The information includes Hash of the private key, its corresponding
pi and the watermarking window ID bid. Assume the window width (chip-rate) is
cr = 50.
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Table 4.1: Maintained Hash Table
It is secure to keep pi and bid along withHash of the private key, for the reason that
Hash is an one-way function. Given the output Hash, it is computational infeasible
to compute the input, that is the private key P . Therefore, even if the Hash Table
is disclosed to non-privileged users, they will not be able to find out how pi and bid
are matched to the private key P , thus can not remove the watermark and view the
original data.
Extraction Phase
The database tuples can be deleted and inserted frequently, and the tuple ordering
loses synchronization with pseudo-noise sequence pi and binary sequence bi. To be
able to extract the watermark and recover the original data without loss, the syn-
chronization is a must.
Figure 4.3 outlines the invertible watermark extraction algorithm. The algorithm
consists of two phases. Phase 1 re-sorts the tuples of watermarked data to synchronize
with pi and bi. Phase 2 scans all the tuples in re-sorted order, and recover the
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watermark bit âj, where âj is the recovered version of aj. Obviously, we aim at
âj = aj. The following paragraphs describe the three phases in more detail.
Invertible Watermarking Removal:
Input: secret key K and sk, watermarked data ŷi, chip rate cr
Output: extracted watermark bit âj , watermark-free data x̂i
Method:
phase 1: database re-sorting
1: for each tuple t in the database do
2: Compute F (t · P ) = H(K ◦H(K ◦ t · P ));
3: Scan the kept Hash table and restore its order by F (t · P );
phase 2: watermark removal and data recovery
1: for each tuple t in the re-sorted order do
2: for each watermark block j ← 0 to M do
3: for each i← j · cr to (j + 1) · cr − 1 and bid = j do
4: Compute aj = cj =
∑(j+1)·cr−1




i · αi · bi;
5: Remove the watermark x̂i = ŷi − α · pi · aj ;
Figure 4.3: Invertible Watermarking Removal
Note that only the watermarked data are stored in the DBMS. We assume the
recovered relation is treated as a snapshot of the relational databases. Note that the
view could be created only based upon a subset of the whole data. And the view will
be destroyed compulsorily after the legitimate user logs off.
Incremental Watermarking
One common concern of watermarking databases is the cost in terms of time and
space. In many applications, databases are updated frequently. Therefore, water-
marking is required to be done frequently as well. Intuitively, the overhead can
be greatly reduced by Incremental Watermarking : If only a small portion of the
databases (eg. a number of tuples) are updated, we re-watermark that small portion
only. Incremental watermarking does not make much sense for watermarking im-
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age or other multimedia contents, as the images or multimedia signals are not to be
updated very often. However, it is of great importance for watermarking databases
as databases are updated frequently and the cost must be carefully considered and
reduced to utmost.
We assume that all the updates to database are applied on watermark-free (wa-
termark removed) data (the view) instead of on the watermarked data. It makes
sense because only Administrators are granted the access to update the data, and
Administrators have access to read the watermark-free data. To update on a wa-
termarked version of the data will only make the process complex and the data in
a mess and irreversible. Incremental watermarking is done afterward based on both
the watermarked version and the updated original data.
Figure 4.4 outlines five cases of database updates, namely update, insert tuple and
delete tuple, insert column,delete column. These five cases are dealt with differently
as Case 2 and Case 3 change the ordering of the tuples if re-sorted, while the others
do not.
For update, only the attributes values are changed, so we can merely watermark
this tuple again with the corresponding pi and bi, and modify the watermarked values
correspondingly in the watermarked databases.
4.4 Multi-level Access
As mentioned in the introduction, different classes of users (Guests, Read-only users,
and Administrators) can be granted different levels of access (multi-level access).
Users are classified into three classes:
1. General Users: can only see watermarked version of the data.
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Incremental Watermarking Algorithm:
Input: updated data x̂i, amplitude factor α, recovered b̂i if Case 1 and Case 4
Output: e-watermarked data ŷi
Method:
Case 1: Update data value
1: Hash the tuple and retrieve corresponding pi;
2: Re-watermark this tuple ŷi = x̂i + α · pi · bi.
Case 2: Insert new tuple
1: Hash the new tuple and add it the end of hash table, generate additional pi and bi;
2: Watermark this tuple ŷi = x̂i + α · pi · bi.
Case 3: Delete one tuple
1: Delete its Hash, pi, and bid from the Hash table;
2: Delete its corresponding tuple from the watermarked table.
Case 4: Insert new column
1: Hash the column and retrieve corresponding pi;
2: Watermark the whole column ŷi = x̂i + α · pi · bi.
Case 5: Delete one column
1: Delete corresponding sequence pi, if pi is not applicable to other columns;
2: Delete its corresponding column in watermarked table.
Figure 4.4: Incremental Watermarking Algorithm
2. Read-only users: are allowed to remove the watermarks partially or fully (de-
fined by the different levels of clearance). With the highest level of clearance,
the user can view the whole watermark-free data.
3. Administrators: can not only read the watermark-free data but also update the
data.
For example, in medical applications, Administrators can be the doctor who can
read and write (even modify) the data and prescription, Read-only users can be the
nurses who read the data and follow instructions, and General users can be other
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people outside the above two classes. In military application, Administrators can be
commanders who make strategies, Read-only users can be soldiers entitled to know
the strategies, while General users can be those from a third party (even the enemies).
Note that Read-only users are granted access to the data to the extent of their
clearance. At one extreme end, users with no clearance at all (i.e. Guests) can only
view the watermarked data, which appears good but is not suitable for high-precision
processing. At the other extreme end, users with full clearance (for example, high-
level Read-only users and Administrators) can invert and remove all the watermarks
so as to obtain the original data. In between are users with intermediate clearance,
who can only remove parts of the watermarks. A simple solution to this problem is to
watermark fractions of the database with different pseudo-random sequences (treated
as secret keys) which are respectively known only to specific groups of users. The
users with high-clearance get to know a set of pseudo-random sequences. While this
is not the main contribution of the work, we do not discuss it in further detail.
4.5 Experimental Study
In this section, we present the experimental study and analyze the cost. Our experi-
ments were performed on the dataset named Ovarian Cancer 1. The dataset consists
of tables with various instances (tuples) and attributes. We choose one table bearing
15,154 instances (tuples) and 2 columns (attributes). We add an extra attribute (a
column with all the values distinct from each other) to serve as the primary key for
the purposes of re-sorting tuples.
We ran our experiments on Windows XP with a P4 1.6GHz Intel processor, 256 MB
of memory, and a 20 GB hard disk drive. The watermark embedding, extraction and
1National Cancer Institute, http://clinicalproteomics.steem.com/
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removal algorithms were coded in C Language. As we embed watermark in spatial
domain, the watermarking and detection scheme can both be run in linear time O(n),
where n is the number of tuples involved in watermarking and detection scheme. In
our experiment, we set the parameters empirically.
4.5.1 Setting Parameters cr and α
Given the invertible watermarking scheme discussed above, we expected the extracted
âj equal to embedded watermark information aj, thus to achieve x̂i = xi. Here, we
experiment on the precision-critical data to see how aj vs âj and xi vs. x̂i match.
Figure 4.5 shows setting α = 0.5, how the chip rate cr affects the percentage of


















































Figure 4.5: Varying chip rate
We can see from Figure 4.5 that given α = 0.5, the percentage of correctly detected
watermark bits increases as the chip rate cr gets larger. Note that for our application,
it is compulsory to recover every watermark bit exactly as it was, so that the percent-
age of correctly detected watermark bits must be 100%. We repeated the detection
phase 50 times, each time with a set of different seeds for the pseudo random sequence
{pi, i = 0, 1, ..., N −1} and {aj, j = 0, 1, ...,M −1}, and experiment results show that
setting cr = 100, we can safely ensure 100% watermark bits to be detected correctly.
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Next, fixing cr = 100, we choose the value of α. Figure 4.6 shows how the percent-















































Figure 4.6: Varying alpha
We can see that the percentage of correctly detected watermark bits increases with
the increase of α. Set α = 0.5 1.0, we can achieve percentage of correctly detected
watermark bits of 100%.
In the following test, we set cr = 50 and α = 0.5.
4.5.2 Varying Percentage of deleted tuples
Without update, delete and insert operations, the precision-critical database can be
correctly inverted. However, the update, delete and insert operations can not be
neglected, as they are likely to mess up the ordering of the re-sorted tuples, make
tuples lose synchronization with the watermark sequence, and introduce error to the
watermark removal phase.
We can see from the earlier discussion that as long as the privileged user has access
to the maintained hash table, insert of one tuple will not make the watermark removal
phase too difficult. However, delete and update will make the watermark not integrity.
On one hand, since the watermark detection phase is spread-spectrum based, it
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can survive tuple (watermark) deletion to some extent.
Figure 4.7 plots how the percentage of wrongly detected watermark bits goes up
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Figure 4.7: Effect of Incremental Watermarking on Running Time
We can see that when the percentage of randomly deleted tuples reaches 70%
and above, the watermark bits can no longer be completely correctly detected. It
means the spread-spectrum based watermark detection can survives up to 70% tuples
randomly deleted while preserving the integrity of the watermark.
On the other hand, because normal database update may change the values greatly,
the embedded watermark may be severely destroyed. With a small portion of the tuple
values updated, depending to what extent the values have been varied, the watermark
detection can be totally wrong. Therefore, we suggest re-watermarking the databases
after updates have been issued. While re-watermark can be very expensive given the
frequency of update operations, our Incremental Watermarking scheme can cleverly
solve this problem. Next, we presents the performance of our invertible watermarking
scheme against varying update percentage.
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4.5.3 Effect of Incremental Watermarking
Here, we compare the computation cost of re-watermarking the whole database
with the cost of incremental watermarking. We compare the running time of these
two watermarking methods, varying the percentage of UPDATES introduced to the
databases. Without loss of generality, UPDATES includes updating values, insert-
ing tuples and deleting tuples only, because the proof of efficiency of incremental























Figure 4.8: Effect of Incremental Watermarking on Running Time
Figure 4.8 shows that when the percentage of UPDATES is below 80% of the
whole databases, incremental watermarking always outperforms conventionally re-
watermarking the whole databases. When the percentage of UPDATES reaches 80%
and above, conventional watermarking performs better. This can be easily under-
standable because searching in the maintained hash table can be time-consuming,
and when too many updates occur, it is slower to search and watermark a part than
to simply re-watermark the whole.
Therefore, incremental watermarking is very much recommended when a small por-
tion (not necessary to be 80% for different databases, and it can be determined by
the application and the database administrator) of the databases is changed. Incre-
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mental watermarking has made our invertible watermarking technique more suitable
for real-life applications.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed the problem of invertible watermarking precision-
critical databases. Given the need for lossless recovering the watermarked data for
military or medical uses, we have presented an invertible spread-spectrum watermark-
ing method in which we utilize a direct sequence spread-spectrum based approach for
watermarking the data. With our watermark extraction method, the watermark can
be removed, and thus the original data can be recovered. We tuned the parameters
(α and cr)in the experiments, and achieved the percentage of correctly recovered data
of 100%.
Also, with Incremental Watermarking, it is no longer necessary to re-watermark
the whole databases, when only a small portion of the data are updated. With
incremental watermarking, the computation cost of updates and re-watermarking can





In this thesis, we proposed two novel techniques for watermarking relational databases,
each with a different purpose.
Firstly, we present Individualized Watermarking of relational databases, where both
ownership establishment and traitor tracing were enabled, in that merely proving the
ownership without identifying the traitor can not compensate the data owner’s loss.
We proposed a spread-spectrum based watermarking scheme, which was resilient to
various attacks, such as data re-sorting, subset selection, subset addition etc., as well
as collusion attacks. The individualized watermarks are collusion-resistant, such that
even the attempt of a few buyers colluding together to destroy the individualized
watermarks will not be successful. Formal security analysis was given, and the ex-
periment results conducted on TPC-H benchmarked databases were given in support
of the analysis. Both the analysis and the experiment results show that the individ-
ualized watermark can withstand a variety of malicious attacks and benign updates,
thus verify the feasibility and reliability of the individualized watermarking scheme.
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Secondly, we proposed Invertible Watermarking of precision-critical databases, tak-
ing into account that in many database applications, i.e. medical, military, satellite
and so on, the accuracy of the data is as important as the copyright protection of
the data, because inaccuracy in these data will not only render the data useless but
result in vicious effects, while free redistribution of the data will cause great capi-
tal loss to the data owner. In this thesis, we discussed two different approaches of
invertible watermarking databases, i.e. LSB and spread-spectrum. We abandoned
LSB approach because of its deficiency and chose spread-spectrum for its higher se-
curity and robustness. Also, we introduced the idea of hierarchical access of the data,
and enabled the function of Incremental Watermarking when only a small portion of
the databases were modified or updated. The experimental study showed that the
precision-critical data can be fully recovered without error for the privileged users,
while being of no value for non-privileged ones. Incremental Watermarking outper-
formed conventional re-watermarking with percentage of updates up to 80%. The
effectiveness of incremental watermarking had made the technique more practical in
real applications.
5.2 Contributions
Naturally, the major contributions of this work fall into two aspects:
First, it identified the importance of right management of relational database
through traitor-tracing, and enunciated possible attacks that individualized water-
mark inserted in relational databases must survive. It also proposed a novel individ-
ualized watermarking technique geared for relational databases, supported by formal
security analysis as well as extensive experimental results.
Second, it articulated of the need for invertible watermarking precision-critical
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data, and first proposed an invertible watermarking technique with multi-level access.
With privileged access to the database, watermark removal was very reliable. Also,
it enabled incremental watermarking, which greatly improved the efficiency of re-
watermarking a modified databases.
5.3 Future Work
In future work, we would like to address the issue of protecting the buyer’s digital
rights. Though in most watermarking scenarios, it is assumed that the seller’s rights
are more important which need to be protected against violation by malicious buyers,
yet it may also happen that the seller may be malicious and may try to falsely impli-
cate an honest buyer. Therefore, it is important to come up with reliable solutions
to protect both the seller and buyers.
Furthermore, we would like to extend our work to watermark non-numeric at-
tributes, and improve the efficiency of the watermarking schemes. Efficient water-
marking is important as to be suitable for watermarking high dimensional databases.
In fact, many real applications are devised for high dimensional data, and thus the
efficiency is of most concern.
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